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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
action the heirs apparent of the widow should be parties. Any decision
given would then become res adjudicata as to the parties.20
HENRY M. WHITESDES.
International Law-The High Seas, The Continental Shelf, and Free
Navigation
Few principles of International Law have been more fully recognized
and accepted than free navigation on the high seas ! Professor Colombos
of the Hague Academy of International Law states, "Today it is uni-
versally recognized that the open sea is not susceptible of appropriation
and that no state can obtain such possession of it as would legally be
necessary to give rise to a claim of property. The high sea cannot be
subject to a right of sovereignty for it is the necessary means of com-
munication between nations and its free use thus constitutes an indis-
pensable element for international trade and navigation."'
I
Though the seas are free today, this was not always so, nor were they
set free without a struggle. From the tenth to the sixteenth century,
English kings made sovereign claims to all seas.2 During the fifteenth
century Pope Alexander, by a Papal Bull of September 25, 1493, par-
titioned the Atlantic Ocean between Portugal and Spain. Denmark,
Genoa, Sweden, Russia, and many other states asserted similar claims
of sovereignty over the high seas. This tide of sovereign claims, how-
ever, soon receded when Queen Elizabeth proclaimed, "The use of the
sea and air is common to all; neither can any title to the ocean belong
to any people or private persons forasmuch as neither nature nor regard
of the public use and custom permitteth any possession thereof." Twenty-
five years later, in 1609, the Dutch publicist Grotius (Hugo de Groot),
traditionally considered the founder of International Law, stated as a
basic principle, "The open sea cannot be subject to the sovereignty of
any state, access to all nations is open to all, not merely by the per-
mission but by the command of the Law of Nations. ' 3 Justice Story,
in The Marianna Flora,4 stated the American view---" . . . [U]pon the
20 In re Morris, 224 N. C. 487, 31 S. E. 2d 539 (1944) ; Cameron v. McDonald,
216 N. C. 712, 6 S. E. 2d 497 (1940) ; Ludwick v. Penny, 158 N. C. 104, 73 S. E.
228 (1910).
* HIcGINS & COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 50 (3d ed. 1954).
2 For a historical outline of these British claims, see FULTON, THE SoVrR-
EIGNTY OF THE SEA (1911).
'GRorius, MARE LiBuEm (1609), contained in c. 12 of GROTIUS, DE JURE
PRAFDAE (CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Scott Trans., 1950).
'24 U. S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1826). To the effect that "International Law is
a part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice . . . ," see Justice Gray's opinion in The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677
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ocean, in time of peace, all possess an entire equality. It is the common
highway of all, appropriated to the use of all, and no one can vindicate
to himself a superior or exclusive prerogative there." Suffice it to say
that for the past two hundred years, the seas, in principle, have been
free to all men for navigation.5
Granting that free navigation on a free sea has gained universal
acquiescence, this is not to say that the high seas are in a state of
anarchy. In order to keep the seas open for navigation, it has become
necessary for the International Community to formulate and adopt rules
and regulations for sea use. The relative safety of our water highways
today will bear witness to the numerous successful conventions which
met on the questions of safety of life at sea, international signals, com-
munications, collisions, carriage of goods, piracy, and control of liquor
and slave trade, to mention but a few.0
A century after Grotius' Open Seas Doctrine appeared, the Dutch
Judge Bynkershoek gave birth to the modern doctrine of territorial
waters, and thereby gave definition to the high seas. He wrote, "Where-
fore on the whole it seems a better rule that the control of the land (over
the sea) extends as far as a cannon will carry; for that is as far as we
seem to have both command and possession."7 This "cannon shot rule"
has for many years been equated with the more familiar, and generally
accepted, Anglo-American "three-mile limit rule," though admittedly the
purpose, national defense, is no longer served.8 All expanse beyond
the territorial waters, or territorial belt or marginal seas, as it is some-
times called, defines the high seas.
The territorial waters are usually determined by running a line parallel
to the shore a specific distance from the shore.9 All of this water, area
above the water, and sea-bed and subsoil below the water of the terri-
torial belt is considered the sovereign territory of the coastal state.10
(1900); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U. S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); Dickinson, The Law of
Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26(1952-53).
'Freedom of Navigation as an international precept follows logically, notwith-
standing the conflicting philosophical bases of res communis and res nullius. See
JEssup, THE LAw OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 75 (1927);
HIGGINS & COLOMBOS, op. cit. supra note 1, § 71.
' For an excellent and authoritative treatment of these various conventions gen-
erally, see BENEDICr, ADMIRALTY (6th ed. 1940); HIGGINS & COLOMBOS, op. cit.
supra note 1, §§ 292-388.
" BYNKERSHOEK, DE DOMINIO MARIS (1702), as contained in CLASSICS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW c. 2, at 44 (Magoflin Trans., 1923).
' See Walker, Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule, 22 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L
L. 210 (1945).
0 Problems of delimitation of territorial Waters cannot be treated within the scope
of this article. See generally the citations under note 11, infra.
"0 Cf. Draft of the Hague Codification Conference 1930, LEAGUE OF NATIONS
PUBLICATION: Art. 2 (1930).
The question of local concern in the United States, as to Whether the State or
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Over this belt, the littoral states exercise jurisdiction and control, sub-
ject only to the right of innocent passage. 1 The Hague Codification
Conference of 1930, though not establishing agreement on the width of
the territorial belt, did determine that no state claims less than a three-
mile limit.' 2  Today, due mainly to English influence around the turn
of the nineteenth century, the majority of maritime states accept the
minimum width of three miles as also the maximum width.' 3
Though the major maritime powers support this three-mile zone,
claims to wider belts have nevertheless been made.14 The most extensive
claims to marginal areas are limited today to twelve miles. The United
States' adherence to the three-mile limit practice since 1794 was re-
affirmed in Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon' 5-". . . [T]he territory subject
to its jurisdiction includes . . . , the ports, harbors, bays, and other
enclosed arms of the sea along its coast and a marginal belt of sea ex-
tending from the coastline outward a marine league or three geographical
miles."16
II
Classic as well as modern International Law publicists tell us that
the modes used by a state for acquiring additional sovereign territory are
Federal Government will exercise this sovereignty over the territorial belt, was
settled in favor of the Federal Government in United States v. California, 332 U. S.
19 (1947). Cf. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 699 (1950), and United States
v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707 (1950). The Submerged Land Act, 67 STAT. 29 (1953),
43 U. S. C. § 1301, reversed the Court to the extent of the three mile limit.
" The right of innocent passage is defined by the International Law Commission
as follows: "Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose
either of traversing that sea without entering internal waters, or of proceeding to
internal waters, or of making for the high seas from internal waters. Passage is
innocent so long as the ship does not use the territorial sea for committing any acts
prejudicial to the security of the coastal state or contrary to the present rules, or
to other rules of international law. Passage includes stopping and anchoring, but
only insofar as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered
necessary by force majeure or by distress." 51 Am. J. INT'L L., Sure. 164 (1957).
On the subject of territorial waters generally, see JEssup, op. cit. supra note 5;
MASTaESON, JUIsDicTION IN MARGINAL SEAS (1929); Harvard Research in
International Law, Territorial Waters, 23 Am. J. INT'L L., SPEc. Supp. 241-46(1929); DANIEL, SOVEREIGNTY AND OWNERSHIP IN THE MARGINAL SEAS 14 (1950);
HIGGINS & CoLomBos, op. cit. supra note 1, c. 3-7.
12 The "mile" here used is the so-called nautical, or marine, or geographical mile.
One league equals three marine miles.
" Reeves, Codification of the Law of Territorial Waters, 24 Am. J. INT'L L. 486
(1930) ; HIGGINS & COLOMBOS, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 77-99.
14 Boggs, National Claims on Adjacent Seas, 61 GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 185
(1951) ; HIGGINS & COLOmBOS, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 86-93.
15262 U. S. 100 at 122 (1922) ; Cf. United States v. Carrillo, 13 F. Supp. 121
(1935).
10 Though fixed in their claims to sovereignty over a specific width of marginal
seas, many states, including the United States, claim additional jurisdiction beyond
the territorial belt and up to twelve miles, for specific reasons-for example, to
enforce revenue, customs, and immigration laws; to enforce and regulate national
sanitation laws; to protect fisheries; etc. See 19 U. S. C. §§ 1581, 1584, 1585,
1586, 1587, 1594; HIGGINS & COLOMBOS, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 106-132; BENEDICT,
op. cit. supra note 6.
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occupation and cession, conquest, prescription, and accretion.' 7  Yet a
fifth method, that of proclamation,' 8 was used by President Harry S.
Truman on September 28, 1945, when he proclaimed the American policy
respecting the natural resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the conti-
nental shelf.19
Though this proclamation stirred little national interest, the interna-
tional repercussions were extensive, for during the following years over
thirty other states have issued similar decrees concerning the continental
shelf; Mexico, most of the Central and South American States, Pakistan,
Iran, South Korea, and the Philippines numbering among them. Of
these, many were put in a stronger and more extensive language, claim-
1
,HALL, INTERNATiONAL LAW, 125 (8th ed. 1925).
18 "Whereas the Government of the United States of America, aware of the long
range world-wide need for new sources of petroleum and other minerals, holds the
view that efforts to discover and make available new supplies of these resources
should be encouraged; and
"Whereas its competent experts are of the opinion that such resources underlie
many parts of the contintental shelf off the coasts of the United States of America,
and that with modern technological progress their utilization is already practicable
or will become so at an early date; and
"Whereas recognized jurisdiction over these resources is required in the interest
of their conservation and prudent utilization when and as development is under-
taken; and
"Whereas it is the view of the Government of the United States that the exercise
of jurisdiction over the natural resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the con-
tinental shelf by the contiguous nation is reasonable and just, since the effectiveness
of measures to utilize or conserve these resources would be contingent upon
cooperation and protection from the shore, since the continental shelf may be re-
garded as an extension of the land-mass of the coastal nation and thus naturally
appurtenant to it, since these resources frequently form a seaward extension of a
pool or deposit lying within the territory, and since self-protection compels the
coastal nation to keep close watch over activities off its shores which are of the
nature necessary for utilization of these resources;
"Now, therefore, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of
America, do hereby proclaim the following policy of the United States of America
with respect to the natural resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the continental
shelf.
"Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its nat-
ural resources, the Government of the United States regards the natural resources
of the subsoil and sea-bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but con-
tiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, sub-ject to its jurisdiction and control. In cases where the continental shelf extends
to the shores of another State, or is shared with an adjacent State, the boundary
shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned in accordance with
equitable principles. The character as high seas of the waters above the continental
shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus
affected." PROc. No. 2667, 3 C. F. R. 39 (Supp. 1945) ; 40 AM. J. IN L L., Sup".
45 (1946).
"o That same day, September 28, 1945, President Truman, by Executive Order,
placed control and jurisdiction of these resources under the Secretary of Interior.
40 Am. J. INT'L L., Supp. 47 (1946).
A White House press release of same date, defined the continental shelf as the
area out from short to a 600 foot depth, 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 484 (1945).
The first congressional assertion of control and jurisdiction over the continental
shelf appertaining to the United States was the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
67 STAT. 462 (1953), 43 U. S. C. 1331 (1953). For an excellent article analyzing
this Act, see Christopher, The Outer Contizental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New
Frontier, 6 STAN. L. REv. 23 (1953-54).
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ing sovereignty over the shelf itself, irrespective of depth. Some went
so far as to claim sovereignty over the high seas above the shelf.20
Among these states which, to date, have officially asserted claims, some
of the powers are conspicuously absent, e.g., England, Russia. Also
France, Italy, Japan, Spain, India, Scandinavian States, and West
Germany are abstainers. Mr. Boggs humorously attributes the sudden
rash of decrees following the Truman Proclamation to "a sort of 'carto-
graphic chauvinism' and a desire to 'keep up with the Joneses.' "21
The concept of the continental shelf has a philosophical as well as a
scientific basis. The philosophical justification for the sovereign ex-
tension over the shelf is often found within the proclamations themselves,
for example, the Truman Proclamation contends that ". . . the continental
shelf may be regarded as an extension of the land-mass of the coastal
nation and thus naturally appurtenant to it. . . ." The scientific basis
is founded in ocean geology and geography. It is generally agreed that
out from the shores of the littoral state the sea-bed gradually falls off to
and levels at about two hundred metres, 22 until it reaches a point (the
limit of the shelf) where the drop becomes suddenly steep and continues
down to the oceanic basin.23  The International Law Commission, at its
fifth session, tentatively approved articles for submission to the General
Assembly of the United Nations wherein the continental shelf is
defined as "... the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas contiguous
to the coast, but outside the area of the territorial sea, td a depth of two
hundred metres.124 The practical purposes of adopting the two hundred
metre line are evident in light of the aforementioned scientific knowledge,
as well as the fact that many nautical charts have the two hundred metre
line already indicated. 25 At this line, however, the extent of the shelf is
by no means uniform. It has been asserted that no shelf exists along
some shores, while in other places, the Yellow Sea and Gulf of Siam, it
extends some 800 miles. It has been estimated that the shelf area all
20 For an analysis of the difference between many of these proclamations, see
generally, Young, Recent Developments with Respect to the Con tiental Shelf,
42 Am. J. INT'L L. 849 (1948) ; Young, Further Claims to Areas Beneath the
High Seas, 43 Am. J. INT'L L. 790 (1949) ; Young, Saudi Arabian Offshore Legisra-
tion, 43 Am. J. INT'L L. 530 (1949) ; Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine
Areas, 27 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 376 (1950) ; Boggs, op. cit. supra note 14, at 185;
Waldock, Legal Basis of Clains to the Continental Shelf, 36 GROTIus Soc., TRANS.
FOR 1950, 115 (1951); MOUTON, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, c. 4 (1952).2
_Delimitations of Seaward Areas Under National Jurisdiction, 45 Am. J. INTL
L. 240 at 241 (1951).
2 200 metres, 100 fathoms, 600 feet, are all approximately equal. 600 feet =
100 fathoms; 200 metres = 656.1 feet.
3 For an impressive collection of this scientific data, see MOUTON, op. cit.
stpra note 20, c. 4.2'48 AM. .. INT'L L., SuPP. 28 (1954).
" See Young's article wherein he proposes that states accept the 200 metre line
as the "legal standard." Legal Status of Sucbmarine Areas Beneath the High Seas,
45 Am. 3. INT'L L. 225 at 234 (1951).
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over the world covers 27,500,000 square kilometres, or 7.6 per cent of
the surface of the oceans.2 6
In spite of the simpliicty achieved by the International Law Com-
mission when it accepted the "200 metre limit" in defining the continental
shelf, at its final session concerning this matter, July 1956, it reverted to
its 1951 position, abandoning in part the geological concept of that
term. In the final report on the Law of the Sea, the Commission added
the following words to the aforementioned definition of the continental
shelf: ". . . or, beyond that limit [referring to the 200 metre line], to
where the depth of the superjacent water admits the exploitation of the
natural resources of the said areas." 27 Here the limits of the "shelf,"
beyond the geographic shelf, are determinable only with reference to the
exploitability of the sea-bed and subsoil.
The amendment to the definition of the continental shelf was prob-
ably made by the Commission in the hope of appeasing those states which
lack an adjacent shelf area. Yet in light of contemporary scientific
knowledge, this recession of certainty-substitution of limits of exploit-
ability for the 200 metre line-is ill-founded, for as a practical matter
exploitation to a depth greater than 600 feet is not now considered
feasible, nor is it expected to become so in the near future. This amend-
ment merely adds one more abstraction to a field already surrounded
by uncertainties.
The late international attention given to the continental shelf is due
principally to two factors: the needs of an ever-increasing population,
confined within the limited availability of land, have turned scientific
research to methods of utilizing the natural resources of the sea-bed and
subsoil; considerations of national defense, though not generally empha-
sized, have been no small consideration. National hopes of locating
rich oil fields, sulphur beds, and other heavy minerals, even uranium, are
even now materializing.28 As of June 1, 1950, twenty-two oil fields west
of the Mississippi River on the Gulf of Mexico were producing on the
continental shelf.2 9 In August, 1954, the United States Government an-
nounced the future construction of radar installations upon the conti-
nental shelf as a means of furthering national security. 30 To-day many
such radar installations are in operation, some as far as 110 miles out
at sea.
SUmEGROvE, THE PULSE OF THE EARTH, 99 (2nd ed., 1947).2 Article 67, Law of the Sea, Report of International Law Commission, U. N.
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 11th Sess., OFFICIAL RECORDS, Supp. No. 9 (A/3159); 51
Am. J. INT'L L., Supp. 177 (1957).
8 See International Law Association's Report of the Forty-third Conference,
Brussels 1948, p. 172 (1948).
2" Weaver, The Continental Shelf of the Gulf of Mexico, BULL. OF Am. Asso.
OF PETROLEUM GEoLoGISTS, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Feb. 1951).
"0 N. Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1954, p. 1,. col. 2; Note 40 CORNELL L. Q. 110 (1954).
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The practical necessities of a Truman Proclamation are seen when
one considers the international consequences of a foreign power moving
within one hundred miles of American shores and drilling for oil, setting
up advance communication bases, or other installations. Mr. Vallat,
speaking of the Truman Proclamation, said, "This unilateral declaration
does not purport to be based on any recognized and established rule of
interantional law, but on what is reasonable and just."3' That these
claims will continue to be insisted upon is open to little doubt; that the
rights sought by these claims will one day be upheld as matters of Inter-
national Law is also evident due to the nature of that law-". .. founded
on justice, equity, convenience, and the reason of the thing, and con-
firmed by long usage."13 2
Judge Lauterpacht, of the International Court of Justice, would carry
this one step further, for he states, ". . . [T]here is no existing principle
or rule of International Law which is opposed to what, for the sake of
brevity, may be called here the doctrine and the practice of the continental
shelf, and the latter has now, in any case, become a part of the Inter-
national Law by unequivocal positive acts of some states, including the
leading maritime powers, and general acquiescence on the part of
others. '33 The wording of some of the state proclamations concerning
the continental shelf would also appear to be in accord with this latter
view.
III
Eleven years have now passed since the Truman Proclamation initi-
ated the practice of the continental shelf. Eleven years ago many people
realized the immediate difficulties- and conflicts that such a proclamation
entails. Today, due to the efforts of those concerned, many of these
difficulties have been reconciled.3 4  Sovereign claims by littoral states
over their adjacent shelf areas have not been challenged; rather the
response has been one in kind. International Law authorities have also
endorsed this practice, basing their arguments upon natural law, justice,
or merely the reason of the thing. This doctrine, however, has been
approved only to the extent that it applies to the shelf itself.35 It is over
21 Continental Shelf, 23 BRaIT. Y. B. INTL L. 333 at 334 (1946).
"Lord Mansfield, as quoted in PoLLocic, ESSAYS IN THE LAW, 64 (1922).
"Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, p. 376.
"4 Sir Cecil Hurst's advice to members of the Grotius Society undoubtedly con-
tributed to the general air of reconciliation and understanding. "The world wants
oil and I think we ought to all approach the study (of the continental shelf) not with
the idea of magnifying the objections but with the intention of finding ways of
overcoming the difficulties with which the whole subject is surrounded." The Con-
tinental Shelf, 34 GROTius Socisry, TRANS. FOR 1948, 153 at 169 (1949).
2" See generally, Vallat, op. cit. supra note 31, 333; Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra
note 20, 376; also MOUTON, op. cit. supra note 20, wherein many of Lauterpacht's
ideas, have been incorporated; Borchard, Resources of Contitental Shelf, 40 Am. J.
INT'L L. 53 (1946) ; Selak, Recent Developments int High Seas Fisheries Juris-
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the more extensive claims that the controversy can still be heard-it
is here that the future of free navigation will be decided.
For our purpose, the continental shelf claims can be divided into three
groups: (1) those claiming sovereign rights over the shelf alone,30 (2)
those claiming sovereign rights over the shelf as well as the epicon-
tinental waters,37 and (3) those claiming sovereign rights over a specific
area of water, irrespective of the continental shelf.33  Properly speaking,
this third group has no connection with the doctrine of the continental
shelf as it is generally understood, unless it be a causal one.39 Gratis
dicta to sovereignty over a broad expense of high seas, without regard
to the continental shelf as a basis of such claims, are obviously contrary to
International Law, as seen by section one of this article. Consequently, no
attempt will be made to directly discuss those claims categorized in group
three, but rather limit the comparisons to ones between group one and
group two above, and the effect of each on freedom of navigaton.
Considering the Truman Proclamation of 1945 as representative of
group one, supra, and the Argentina Declaration as representative of
group two, supra, wherein lies the difference? The Argentina Declara-
tion clearly lays claim to the continetnal shelf itself. The operative sec-
tion reads: "It is hereby declared that the Argentine Epicontinental Sea
and Continental Shelf are subject to the sovereign power of the Na-
tion."'40 The United States proclamation purports to claim jurisdiction
and control only over the "natural resources" within the shelf. The
diction Under Presidential Proclamation of 1945, 44 Am. J. INTIL L. 670 (1950);
Young, op. cit. supra note 25, 225; GmrEL, LA PLATAFORMA CONTINENTAL ANTE EL
DERECHO, 169 (Trans. by Rubio, 1950) ; Kunz, Continental Shelf and International
Law: Confusion and Abuse, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 828 (1956); LEE, DIVERGENCIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL
WArERS, Dissertation for M. Litt. Degree at University of Cambridge, June, 1951;
Phleger, Recent Developments Affecting the Regine of the High Seas, 32 DEP'T
STATE BuUL. 934-40 (June 6, 1955); Smith, Expanded Maritimne Jurisdiction, 19
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 469 (1950-51); Trigg, National Sovereignty Over Maritime
Resources, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 82 (1950).
" Those states which issued proclamations of the "group one" character are:
United States (1945) ; Bahamas (1948); Jamaica (1948) ; Guatemala (1949) ;
Philippines (1949) ; Saudi Arabia (1949); United Kingdom of Bahrain-The Arab
Shiekdoms (1949); Brazil (1950); British Honduras (1950); Falkland Islands(1950) ; Iran (1950) ; Pakistan (1950) ; Israel (1950).
" Those states which issued proclamations of the "group two" character are:
Mexico (1945) ; Argentina (1946) ; Panama (1946) ; Iceland (1948) ; Costa Rica
(1949); Australia (1953).
" Those states which issued proclamations of the "group three" character are:
Chile (1947); Peru (1947); Nicaragua (1949); El Salvador (1950); Honduras(1950) ; Ecuador (1951) ; South Korea (1952).
" See Kunz' excellent article wherein he shows the incompatibility between the
doctrine of the continental shelf and the "group three" type proclamations as well
as the illegality of such claims. Kunz, op. cit. supra note 35, 828. For state protest
notes on the Chilean and Peruvian claims, see Replies front Governments to
Questionnaires of the International Law Commission, A/CN. 4/9, March 23, 1950,
p. 113.
" 41 Am. J. INT'L L., Su',. 12 (1947).
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operative section reads: ". . [T]he Government of the United States
regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the continental
shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coast of the United
States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and
control." 41 Yet, ". .. [o]ne cannot read this proclamation (Truman's)
without feeling that within the area of its Continental Shelf, the United
States is claiming rights as large as sovereignty. ' 42  "It is difficult to
see what distinction there is between control over the 'natural resources'
and control over the subsoil and sea-bed themselves. Anything of value
might be included in 'natural resources,' and any use or interference with
the subsoil or sea-bed might equally be regarded as a use of or interfer-
ence with their 'natural resources.' Therefore, it does not seem that the
use of this expression imports any real limitation, and the claim may be
taken as relating to the sea-bed and subsoil themselves. '43 For practical
purposes, therefore, we can say that in this respect the American and
Argentine claims are not conflicting.
The major difference between the United States Presidential
Proclamation and the Argentina Declaration is in the purported sover-
eignty over the waters above the shelf, though both decrees expressly
state that rights of free navigation are in no way affected. The operative
section of the Truman Proclamation is: "The character is high seas of
the water above the continental shelf and the right to their free and un-
impeded navigation are in no way thus affected, ' 44 while the operative
wording of the Argentina Declaration is: "For purposes of free naviga-
tion the character of the waters situated in the Argentine Epicontinental
Sea and above the Argentine Continental Shelf, remains uneffected by the
present declaration. ' '45
The Argentine assertion of sovereignty over their epicontinental
waters is to some degree a reasonable one. Is it not a matter of
linguistic sophistry to hypothesize sovereignty over the shelf area with-
out concurrent sovereignty over the epicontinental seas? Could a state
fully exercise sovereignty over the shelf area, exploiting the natural re-
sources, without complete freedom and control of the sea above? Ob-
viously not. On the other hand, it is an antimony to assert sovereignty
over waters, while at the same time asserting that free navigation will
not thereby be affected. The principle of free navigation depends for
its existence on free seas, res communes. Therefore, the only conceivable
right conferred by the Argentina Declaration is that of innocent passage.
If it is true that the lack of sovereign control over the epicontinental sea
"For full text of the Proclamation, see note 18 supra.
42 Hurst, op. cit. mipra note 34, at 162.
"Vallat, Qp. cit. supra note 31, at 336.
"See full text, note 18 supra.
" Full text printed in 41 Am. J. INT'L L., Supp. 11 (1947).
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affects adversely the scope of sovereign control over the shelf itself,
then this latter control must suffer.
In view of the protests to the Argentine claims,4 6 and in the opinions
of recognized contemporary publicists, 47 sovereign claims to high seas
are, a fortiori, illegal. Once a state is permitted to establish a legal claim
over large areas of water merely on the strength of their superposition
to the continental shelf, it is but a small step for other states to likewise
claim sovereignty over their adjacent high seas, irrespective of the shelf.
This is, in effect, what Chile and the other "group three" states have at-
tempted to do.48 Allow this to happen and the international community
will have regressed to their 14th century position; a position they fought
so valiantly to overcome.49
Of course, the exploitation of natural resources within the shelf will
necessarily cause some obstruction to navigation; yet it is insisted that
this obstruction should never be unreasonable. The tendency is to view
the setting up of oil wells or pumping stations on waters over the shelf,
as merely another "use" of the high seas, in the same manner that free
navigation for transportation and commerce is a "use." Which use in
each case will prevail shall be determined by an, equitable balance of the
conflicting interests.50 What is and what is not unreasonable, must ulti-
mately be decided on the merits of each case. It is conceivable that
substantial interference with navigation could be justified in one case,
while insignificant interference in another could be found totally unjusti-
fiable. The decision of justification will initially lie with the coastal
state, however, the International Law Commission provided in Article
73 concerning the Law of the Sea, that disputes not otherwise peacefully
46 Replies from Govermients to Questionnaires of the International Law Com-
mission, op. cit. supra note 39, 113; 24 DEP'T STATE BuLL. (Jan. 1, 1951).
'7 See generally the citation under footnote No. 35, supra.
"For arguments in support of the "group three" view, see Aramburu y Men-
chaca, Character and Scope of the Rights Declared and Practiced Over the Conti-
nental Sea and Shelf, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 120 (1953) ; see also Young's attempted
rebuttal, Over-extension of the Continental Sea, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 454 (1953).
Also in support of the "group three" claims, erroneously coupled with the concept
of territorial waters, see Garioca's argumentum ad hominein, The Continental Shelf
and the Extension of the Territorial Sea, 10 MIAM1i L. Q. 490 (1956); and in
answer, Bayitch, International Fishery Problems in the Western Hempisphere, 10
MIAMI L. Q. 499 (1956).
" Enforcement of the "group three" claims in the future might be considered
a casus belli. The countries involved, though refusing to test their 200 mile claim
to high seas in the International Court of Justice, have enforced the purportedjurisdictional control. In 1955 Ecuador seized two American flag-vessels which
were sailing within the 200 mile radius. One American seaman was seriously in-jured by Ecuadorean gun fire.-In 1954 Peruvian war vessels and airplanes seized
five Panamanian flag-vessels, while sailing 300 miles off the Peruvian coast. The
charge was labeled "piratical." It is clear that the "group three" states intend to
enforce their decrees claiming exclusive fishing rights within the so-called 200 miles
of territorial waters. Official protests were to no avail. Kunz, op. cit. supra note
35, 828.
"0 MouToN, op. cit. supra note 20, c. 3.
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settled concerning the "reasonableness of interference" be referred to the
International Court of Justice.51
It is also conceded that the littoral state ought to be allowed to exer-
cise sovereign controls over the people and tools used to exploit the shelf,
as well as some control over the water area occupied in this endeavor,
however, this latter control is in no way comparable to sovereignty. The
coastal state, engaged in exploration and exploitation of its natural re-
sources would have, for example, jurisdiction for the prevention and
punishment of crime, as well as other causes of action now recognized
in Admiralty.
The International Law Commission's final report of its eighth session,
1956, covering The Law of the Sea, as requested by the United Nations,
included a set of rules which would give reasonable protection to both
freedom of navigation and the continental shelf doctrine. 5 2
Art. 68: The coastal state exercises over the continental shelf sover-
eign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its nat-
ural resources.
Art. 69: The rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not
affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas,
or that of the airspace above those waters.
Art. 70: Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the ex-
ploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its
natural resources, the coastal state may not impede the laying
or maintenance of submarine cables on the continental shelf.
Art. 71. 1. The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation
of its natural resources must not result in any unjustifiable
interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of
the living resources of the sea.
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 5 of this
article, the coastal state is entitled to construct and main-
tain on the continental shelf installations necessary for the
exploration and exploitation of its natural resources, and
to establish safety zones at a reasonable distance around
such installations and take in those zones measures neces-
sary for their protection.
3. Such installations, though under the jurisdiction of the
Article 73, op. cit. supra note 27; 51 AM. J. INT'L L., Supp. 178 (1957).
U. N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 11th Sess. (Eight Session of International Law
Commission), OF'crAL RECORDS, Supp. No. 9 (A/3159); 51 Am. J. INT'L L., SuPp.
154 at 177-78 (1957).
For reports of the International Law Commission covering the seven preceding
sessions, see the AM. J. INT'L L. SUPPLEMENTS: Vol. 44 (1950) (1st and 2d Sess.) ;
Vol. 45 (1951) (3rd Sess.); Vol. 47 (1953) (4th Sess.); Vol. 48 (1954) (5th
Sess.) ; Vol. 49 (1955) (6th Sess.) ; Vol. 50 (1956) (7th Sess.).
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coastal state, do not possess the status of islands. They
have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence
does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea of the
coastal state.
4. Due notice must be given of any such installations con-
structed, and permanent means for giving warning of their
presence must be maintained.
5. Neither the installations themselves, nor the said safety
zones around them may be established in narrow channels
or where interference may be caused in recognized sea lanes
essential to international navigation.
Precepts of International Law ultimately depend upon international
acceptance, be it expressed or implied. Without this acceptance, no Jus
Gentium exists.5 3 Which type of unilateral claims, those asserted by the
Truman Proclamation or those asserted by the Argentina Declaration,
will become established principles of international law, only the future
:an tell. Yet the direction of this acceptance cannot be doubted today.
Free navigation-juris et de jure!
H. WALLACE ROBERTS.
Libel-Multi-State Defamation-Place of Commission of Tort
In recent years courts throughout the country have often been faced
with the problems of multi-state defamation arising from national dis-
tribution of books and periodicals and from the wide coverage of radio
and television programs. Yet, there has been almost a complete judicial
reluctance to face these problems squarely. Many courts have failed to
discuss the issue when it was obviously present.' In some cases the scope
of recovery was not clearly set out ;2 and, even where the issue was cor-
rectly presented, courts have on occasion applied the law of the forum
" "International law consists in certain rules of conduct which modern civilized
states regard as being binding on them in their relations with one another with a
force comparable in nature and degree to the binding the conscientious person to
obey the laws of his country, and which they also regard as being enforceable by
appropriate means in case of infringement." HALL, op. cit. supra note 17, at 1.
"What is internationlaw law? It is the body of principles and rules which civil-
ized States consider as binding upon them in their mutual relations. It rests upon
the consent of Sovereign States." Hughes, The World Court as a Going Concern,
16 A. B. A. J. 151 at 153 (1930).
' Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 40 (S. D. N. Y. 1944);
Wright v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1944); Backus
v. Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) ; Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F.
Supp. 660 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Means v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 25 F. Supp.
993 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
2Brinkley v. Fishbein, 110 F. 2d 62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 672(1940) ; Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
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